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Abstract: This paper examines the potential impact of recent English privacy 
jurisprudence on the New Zealand tort of privacy. The paper contrasts the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal’s aversion towards an over-expansive privacy right expressed in Hosking 
v Runting with an increasing readiness to override freedom of expression in favour of 
privacy interests in the United Kingdom. Three central conflicts in the courts’ reasoning 
are addressed in detail, namely privacy’s relationship with public places, individuals with 
public profiles and mediums of publication. While developments in English privacy law 
highlight reasoning flaws and theoretical shortcomings in Hosking, the increasing influence 
European jurisprudence on English law may nevertheless justify some divergence in the 
two jurisdictions’ balancing of privacy and freedom of expression.  
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Balancing the right to privacy and freedom of expression: Re-evaluating 
Hosking v Runting in the light of recent developments in English privacy 
law 
 
I Introduction 
 
In March 2004, the New Zealand Court of Appeal declined to prevent the publication of 
photographs of broadcaster Mike Hosking’s 18 month old twins on a shopping trip with 
their mother. While recognising that a tort of privacy existed in New Zealand, Hosking v 
Runting held that a successful outcome was not “reasonably open” to the plaintiffs.1  
 
In April 2014, the United Kingdom Queen’s Bench considered whether to award 
compensation to musician Paul Weller for an action on behalf of his 10 month old twins 
and 16 year old daughter for the unauthorised publication of photographs of a family 
shopping trip.2 Despite the close factual analogy with Hosking, Weller v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd stated that the photographs constituted an invasion of privacy sufficient to 
satisfy a misuse of private information claim; the United Kingdom equivalent of New 
Zealand’s privacy tort.3  
 
The contrasting outcomes of Hosking and Weller are particularly significant given that the 
majority in Hosking equated the English common law privacy approach with the New 
Zealand tort of privacy.4 This suggests that English law has diverged significantly from 
New Zealand’s approach since Hosking. This paper evaluates the extent to which these 
developments should prompt a reconsideration of the New Zealand approach to balancing 
individual privacy rights with the media’s freedom of expression.  
 
This paper first outlines widely-cited theoretical justifications for the right to privacy and 
freedom of expression. Second, the paper summarises the legal tests for privacy in each 
jurisdiction. The paper then evaluates the key areas of conflict between Hosking and recent 
English jurisprudence, namely in their treatment of public places, individuals with public 
  
1 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [160].   
2 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB).  
3 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [90].  
4 At [90].  
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profiles and mediums of publication.5 These areas are analysed in the light of the theoretical 
foundations of privacy and freedom of expression, the constitutional frameworks for these 
rights and domestic legal precedent. Finally, the paper considers the extent to which the 
recent English jurisprudence should encourage New Zealand courts to depart from 
Hosking. 
 
II Theory 
 
In order to assess the courts’ reasoning in Hosking and post-Hosking English decisions, 
this paper first explores the theoretical justifications for the right to privacy and freedom 
of expression.  
A Theoretical foundations of privacy  
1 What is privacy? 
 
(a) Privacy as a subjective concept  
 
While a universally-accepted definition is elusive,6 most commentators agree that privacy 
is a subjective concept. These theorists contend that privacy cannot be described as an 
objective state of social isolation, whereby others have no physical access to and possess 
no information about a person.7  Instead, given the Aristotelian truism that man is a social 
animal,8 privacy must be situated within the social context of human interaction.9 As most 
humans do not possess an absolute desire for social isolation, the extent of an individual’s 
desire for privacy constantly fluctuates.10 Humans seek to achieve and maintain these 
fluctuating desires for social isolation.  
 
  
5 Note: These categories do not provide an exhaustive analysis of differences between the cases. Additional 
differences include the courts’ application of their obligations to protect children under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
6 Melissa Waterfield “Now you see it, now you don’t: the case for a tort of infringement of privacy in New 
Zealand” (2004) 10 CLR 182 at 185; Ministry of Justice A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper 
1985 at [10.144]; Hosking v Runting, above n 1 at [211]-[220], [270]. 
7 Law Commission A Conceptual Approach to Privacy (NZLC MP19, 2007) at [100]-[109].   
8 At [75].   
9 Charles Raab “Privacy, Democracy, Information” in B Loader (ed) The Governance of Cyberspace 
(Routledge, London, 1997) 155 at 161-165. 
10 Law Commission, above n 7, at [91]. 
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This suggests that privacy law should protect an individual’s control over his or her social 
connectedness or isolation. Legal commentator Nicole Moreham’s widely-cited definition 
describes privacy in these terms, namely as control over “desired inaccess” or freedom 
from the “unwanted access” of others to oneself or one’s personal information.11 Given 
that this thesis has been advanced by other prominent privacy commentators12 and was 
preferred in the Law Commission’s research paper,13 this paper analyses the theoretical 
merits of the case law using this definition.  
 
(b) Informational privacy 
 
This paper analyses the conflicting legal approaches to protecting informational privacy. 
There are two generally-accepted subsets of privacy, namely informational privacy and 
spatial privacy.14 Informational privacy protects one’s personal or intimate information.15 
As the Hosking tort and the United Kingdom misuse of private information action are both 
designed to address informational privacy, the paper is confined to this subset.16 
 
While informational privacy might traditionally be understood as limited to intimate or 
embarrassing information, Moreham’s definition extends the concept to innocuous 
information. Given that Moreham’s conceptualisation of privacy is purely subjective, the 
enquiry focuses on an individual’s desire to restrict certain information, as opposed to the 
objectively private nature of the information itself. Therefore, prevailing societal opinions 
about what constitutes personal or private information are irrelevant in determining 
whether a normative claim of privacy exists.  As Butler and Butler note, privacy can 
potentially cover non-intimate and seemingly banal information such as a photograph of a 
person walking down a street.17  
 
 
 
  
11 Nicole Moreham “Privacy in Public Places” (2006) 65 CL J 606 at 617. 
12 For example: Ruth Gavison ‘‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’’ (1979) 89 Yale LJ 421; James Rachels 
‘‘Why privacy is important’’ (1975) 4(4) Phil & Publ Aff 323. 
13 Law Commission, above n 7, at [136].  
14 At [114].  
15 At [112]-[114].  
16 The recent High Court decision of C v Holland purports to cover spatial privacy in the New Zealand 
context. See: C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
17 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2006) at 348.  
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2 When should legal protection be afforded to privacy?  
 
(a) Distinction between normative and legal right to privacy  
 
However, given the potentially limitless scope of Moreham’s definition of privacy, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the normative reach of privacy and its corresponding legal 
rights. A legal right to privacy ought to be limited in scope in order to avoid a “chilling 
effect” on freedom of expression.18 In most cases, privacy violations will be sanctioned 
through “ongoing adjustment of inter-personal relations.”19 For instance, revealing 
another’s personal information might cause a relationship to “cool in intensity, wither or 
cease altogether”.20 According to Mark Hickford, senior consultant to the Law 
Commission, legally sanctioning such interactions would be onerous and oppressive, and 
would have a detrimental impact on freedom of expression. Therefore, a legal right to 
privacy must be confined to a particular threshold of privacy breach.  
 
(b) Methods of limiting the scope of a legal right to privacy  
 
Several methods can be employed to limit the scope of a legal right to privacy. First, a legal 
right could be restricted through a harm requirement. As discussed above, an invasion of 
privacy can occur independently of harm caused to the individual. As philosopher Edward 
Bloustein notes, the extent of harm may be relevant in determining the legal weight 
attached to an invasion:21  
 
Where private information is wrongfully gained and subsequently communicated, the 
wrong is made out independently of the communication. Communication in such a 
case, whether to one person or many, is not of the essence of the wrong and only goes 
to enhance damages. 
 
Whereas torts such as battery and trespass are actionable per se, or without proof of 
damage, limiting a privacy tort to actions causing tangible harm may be necessary to avoid 
the aforementioned danger of causing a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The extent 
of harm required by the tort will affect the scope of privacy invasions legally actionable. 
  
18 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [220] per Keith J.  
19 Law Commission, above n 7, at [90].  
20 At [90].  
21 Edward J Bloustein “Privacy as an aspect of human dignity: an answer to Dean Prosser” in Ferdinand D 
Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, United 
Kingdom, 1984) 156 at 169-170.  
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For instance, a tort actionable on the basis of mere offence will have significantly wider 
reach than a tort requiring serious emotional distress.  
 
Second, the normative definition of privacy can be qualified in the legal context through 
an objective element. Moreham argues that basing legal sanctions on a purely subjective 
perception of “personal information” would be “unacceptably far-reaching”, as the tort 
could have potentially limitless coverage.22 This subjective desire must be “disciplined” by 
an objective appreciation for the private nature of the information in order to avoid overly-
expansive legal protection.23 Hickford argues that such an objective limitation is achieved 
in New Zealand and English law by requiring applicants to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.24   
3 Why should privacy be protected? 
 
The value of privacy can be ascertained by reference to the key human values which it 
supports. While privacy can be characterised as a natural human desire inherently worthy 
of protection,25 the value of privacy rests primarily in its ability “foster the conditions for 
a wide range of other aspects of human flourishing”.26 Therefore, exploring the 
justifications for legal privacy protection is best achieved through reference to the values 
which privacy fosters. 
 
(a) Autonomy 
 
First, several commentators contend the privacy is essential to the realisation of human 
autonomy. The notion of autonomy denotes the capacity of humans to live their lives 
according to their own choosing,27 or the ability to pursue one’s own idea of a worthwhile 
life.28 Privacy supports autonomy by removing impediments which might constrain an 
individual from pursuing his or her own life choices. Given that humans are social beings, 
individuals often feel pressure to adjust their behaviour to conform to social groups. 
Therefore, affording individuals a degree of privacy protection allows them to engage in 
  
22 Nicole Moreham, above n 11, at 617.  
23 Law Commission, above n 7, at [136].  
24 At [124].  
25 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [264] per Anderson J.  
26 David Feldman “Privacy-Related Rights and their Social Value” in Peter Birks (ed) Privacy and Loyalty 
(Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 1997) 15 at 21.  
27 Law Commission, above n 7, at [4.1.1]. 
28 James Griffin On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 233. 
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behaviour without feeling constrained by prevailing societal attitudes, where such 
behaviour might otherwise provoke “unpleasant or hostile” reactions from others.29  
 
(b) Dignity 
 
Second, privacy supports human dignity. Human dignity is based on the idea that all 
humans are entitled to an equal level of respect.30 This entitlement rests on the innate value 
of a human being, whereby “each individual life is an end in itself.”31 Commentators 
contend that invasions of privacy are a threat to human dignity. Bloustein argues that 
privacy protects individuals from aspects of their lives life being held up to public scrutiny 
without their consent, regardless of whether the unauthorised publicity has detrimental 
impacts on the person.32 This is based on the idea that unauthorised publicity is per se an 
affront to human dignity, as every person is equally entitled to respect for his or her private 
life.33 As Bloustein observes,34  
 
The wrong in the public disclosure cases is not in changing the opinions of others, but 
in having facts about private life made public. The damage is to an individual's self-
respect in being made a public spectacle. 
B Theoretical foundations of freedom of expression 
 
In contrast to ongoing debates around a comprehensive definition of privacy, most 
commentators cite three primary justifications for freedom of expression. These are the 
argument from truth, the argument from democracy and the argument from self-fulfilment 
and autonomy.  
 
 
  
29 Katherine Laura Thompson “Balancing Privacy and Free Speech: A Critique of English Privacy Law under 
the Human Rights Act” (2 December 2013) Durham University <www.etheses.dur.ac.uk> at 6.  
30 Stanley I Benn “Privacy, freedom, and respect for persons” in Ferdinand D Schoeman (ed) Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1984) 223 at 224.  
31 Mark E Warren “Democracy and the state” in John S Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 382 at 385. 
32 Edward J Bloustein, above n 21, at 168-169.  
33 At 169.  
34 At 170.  
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1 Argument from truth 
 
First, freedom of expression literature submits that the right facilitates the discovery of 
truth. This argument was partly pioneered by John Stuart Mill. Mill argued that speech 
regulation defers excessive power to the government to assess the veracity of ideas.35 In 
suppressing allegedly false speech, the government assumes authority to decide the 
speech’s truthfulness “for all mankind”.36 Such a situation erroneously implies that the 
government’s ability to judge the veracity of speech is infallible.37 Instead, Mill contends 
that free public discussion is a better forum to assess the legitimacy of an idea. If the speech 
is found to be true, any contrary belief may be corrected. In addition, where the speech is 
established as false, a “clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth” is 
ascertained.38  
 
Alternatively, one widely-cited form of this argument employs the imagery of a 
“marketplace of ideas”. This theory contends that superior ideas and opinions will 
outcompete their inferior counterparts where the exchange of ideas is unregulated by the 
state.39 Therefore, the truth will “emerge victorious from the competition among ideas.”40  
2 Argument from democracy 
 
Second, commentators argue that freedom of expression is central to the functioning of 
democracy. According to philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, western liberal democracies 
are founded on citizen participation in governance.41 Freedom of expression is necessary 
to allow citizens to effectively determine issues relevant to governance, in granting the 
public full access to competing ideas.42 Any censorship of speech relevant to political 
issues would undermine the population’s ability to make fully-informed decisions.43  
 
  
35 John Gray and GW Smith JS Mill on liberty: in focus (Routledge, London, 1991) at 37.  
36 At 37. 
37 At 37.  
38 At 37.  
39 Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) at 11.  
40 F Schauer Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1982) at 
16. 
41 Alexander Meiklejohn Political Freedom: the Constitutional Powers of the People (Harper and Row, New 
York, 1965) at 26.  
42 At 26-27.  
43 At 26-27.  
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While Meiklejohn’s theory is confined to political expression, the constitutional democracy 
theory supports the protection of all forms of speech. Widely-cited freedom of expression 
theorist Eric Barendt argues that equality is a key democratic value which sits alongside 
self-governance.44 Given the importance of equality, democratic governments must ensure 
equal access to political debate. 45 This suggests that democratically-elected governments 
should be precluded from any regulation of public discourse, given the danger of 
undermining equal access to public debate.46 According to Barendt, this theory extends to 
protecting non-political speech, as the government should not be entrusted with 
determining the bounds of public discourse, as they may deliberately or inadvertently 
suppress legitimate public discourse.47  
3 Argument from self-fulfilment and autonomy 
 
Third, freedom of expression is widely appreciated for its role in advancing individuals’ 
self-fulfilment and autonomy. Commentators argue that imparting information to others 
allows the speaker or writer to develop emotionally, and is therefore central to their self-
fulfilment. Self-fulfilment is either appreciated as intrinsically valuable, or for its role in 
creating more thoughtful individuals and a more reflective society.48  
 
In addition, freedom of expression can contribute to the autonomy of citizens. According 
to theorist Thomas Scanlon, freedom of expression enables individuals to receive 
competing ideas and independently assess them, instead of deferring this role to the state.49 
Scanlon argues that this is a precondition to individual autonomy, as “an autonomous 
person cannot accept without independent consideration the judgement of others as to what 
he should believe or what he should do.”50  
 
 
 
 
  
44 Eric Barendt, above n 39, at 19.  
45 At 19.  
46 At 20.  
47 At 20.  
48 At 13. 
49 At 13.  
50 Thomas Scanlon “A Theory of Freedom of Expression” in Ronald Dworkin (ed) The Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 1977) 163. 
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III Legal tests  
 
The New Zealand and English courts have attempted to reconcile the fundamental 
underlying values advanced by the right to privacy and freedom of expression through the 
following legal frameworks.   
A New Zealand tort of privacy 
 
The majority in Hosking acknowledged the existence of the tort of privacy in New Zealand. 
The first two limbs of the Hosking test consider whether the plaintiff has a legal right to 
privacy. These elements are: 51 
 
1. The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy; and 
2. Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to 
an objective reasonable person 
 
Where the plaintiff satisfies these limbs, the court examines whether his or her right to 
privacy should be outweighed by the media’s freedom of expression claims through a 
defence of legitimate public interest.52  
B United Kingdom misuse of private information action 
 
The United Kingdom equivalent of the Hosking tort is a two-stage misuse of private 
information action. Like in Hosking, the court first determines whether the claimant has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, unlike Hosking, the court does not then 
consider whether the publication is highly offensive.53 Where the claimant is found to 
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court then undertakes an “ultimate 
balancing test”, exploring “how the balance should be struck as between the individual’s 
right to privacy on the one hand and the publisher’s right to publish on the other.”54 The 
ultimate balancing test can roughly be equated with the balancing exercise undertaken in 
Hosking in the context of the public interest defence.55 
  
51 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [117].  
52 At [129]-[130].  
53 This highly offensive limb was rejected by the House of Lords in Campbell. See: Campbell v MGN Ltd 
[2004] UKHL 22, [2004] AC 457 at [22].  
54 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [16]-[17]. 
55 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [129]-[130].  
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In executing the ultimate balancing test, the English courts consider the claimant’s right to 
privacy as articulated in art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).56 Article 8 provides that “everyone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”57 
Similarly, the content of the publisher’s freedom of expression rights is ascertained from 
art 10 of the ECHR, which safeguards the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.” 58 
 
Excepting the highly offensive element in the Hosking tort, the New Zealand and English 
privacy tests appear analogous. However, the following sections explore the increasingly 
divergent approaches the courts have taken in each jurisdiction in interpreting and applying 
these legal tests.  
 
IV Key divergences in the courts’ reasoning  
A Public places 
 
This section explores the contrasting approaches of the New Zealand and English courts to 
protecting individuals’ privacy in public places. While the United Kingdom is potentially 
open to recognising expectations of privacy in relation to innocuous public activities, this 
section argues that doctrinal, constitutional and cultural divergences between the 
jurisdictions preclude the New Zealand courts from following this approach.  
1 Case analysis 
 
While both Hosking and Weller accepted some extension of privacy protection to public 
places, the cases differ in defining the nature of public activities falling within the ambit of 
privacy protection. Hosking adopted a considerably narrower approach to protecting 
privacy in public places vis à vis its United Kingdom counterpart. 
 
 
  
56 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS 5 (opened for 
signature 4 November 1990, entered into force 3 September 1953).   
57 Article 8.   
58 Article 10.   
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(a) Hosking 
 
In Hosking, the Court of Appeal stated that photographs taken in public places do not 
generally attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court unanimously held that the 
photographs at issue did not contain any facts worthy of privacy protection, as they did 
“not disclose anything more than could have been observed by any member of the public… 
on that particular day”.59 In addition, the photographs did not contain any information 
which might endanger the children’s safety.60  
 
Further, the Court dismissed the appellants’ claims that permitting publication would result 
in a “constant” fear of similar media intrusions.61 The Court declined to consider the 
possibility of future intrusive publications, stating that “if there is no case for relief now, 
we cannot address the future.”62 Moreover, the Court considered that parental concerns 
about media intrusion were “overstated”.63  
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal noted that privacy rights may arise in public places in 
exceptional cases. Gault and Blanchard JJ cited English cases recognising privacy rights in 
situations of public humiliation or embarrassment, such as photographs of a claimant 
attending a narcotics clinic or attempting suicide.64 While the Court accepted that such 
cases “perhaps” qualify the general rule against privacy recognition in public places, the 
innocuous nature of the Hosking’s family shopping trip precluded it from falling under this 
exception.65  
 
In addition to failing under the first limb of the Hosking tort, the Court noted that 
photographs in public places will generally struggle to satisfy the “highly offensive” limb. 
The Court held that the reasonable person would not find the publication of the Hosking 
photographs sufficiently offensive, as there was no “real harm” in the photographs.66   
 
 
 
  
59 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [164].  
60 At [164]. 
61 At [161].  
62 At [162].  
63 At [164].  
64 At [164]. 
65 At [164].  
66 At [165].  
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(b) Weller 
 
In contrast to Hosking, Weller accepted that a wide range of public activities can trigger a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. First, Dingemans J classified the Weller’s shopping trip 
as a “private family activity”.67 This approach is based on the European case of von 
Hannover v Germany (No 1) 68 and the English case of Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd. 69    
 
In von Hannover (No 1), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the 
concept of “private life” in art 8 of the ECHR was capable of protecting innocuous public 
activities. According to the Court, art 8 protects the “development, without outside 
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human 
beings.”70 In order to facilitate such development, art 8 covers a “zone” of interaction with 
others, even where such interaction occurs in a public place.71 The Court held that this zone 
of interaction encompassed the claimant’s “private recreation time”, which extended to 
photographs showing the claimant undertaking innocuous public activities, such as leaving 
a restaurant and playing sport.72  
 
Moreover, the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Murray followed von Hannover (No 1) 
in holding that routine activities carried out in public could arguably attract a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The Court held that leisure activities, such as a café expedition, 
could be characterised as part of a person’s private recreation time.73 Nevertheless, the 
Court declined to delineate the types of activities which would constitute “recreation time”, 
instead insisting that the enquiry is highly contextual.74 Given that the publicity of such 
activities would adversely affect family recreation time in the future, the Court held that 
the claimant arguably had a reasonable expectation of privacy.75 This approach signals a 
potential divergence from the House of Lords decision in Campbell v MGN, where the 
Court held that United Kingdom privacy law did not protect innocuous public activities, 
instead requiring a situation of “humiliation or severe embarrassment.”76  
  
67 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [159].  
68 Case C-59320/00 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294.  
69 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2008] 3 WLR 1360 at [55]. 
70 At [50].  
71 At [50].  
72 At [61].  
73 At [55]. 
74 At [55]. 
75 At [55]. 
76 At [75]. However, the House of Lords did not dismiss the possibility for future development: see [154].  
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In addition to characterising the family shopping trip as “essentially private” and therefore 
capable of attracting privacy protection,77 Weller suggested that children may have an 
automatic reasonable expectation of privacy in public places. The Court cited the 
contention in Murray that children arguably have a right to privacy in public places, where 
there is a reasonable expectation that they will not be targeted by photographers.78 While 
Dingemans J did not make any independent assessment of this contention, the fact that the 
claimants were children was listed as a central factor in the Court’s finding of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.79 
2 To what extent should Weller prompt a reconsideration of the Hosking approach to 
public places? 
 
The following section first criticises the Hosking reluctance to recognise privacy rights in 
public places in the light of its reasoning and the aforementioned theoretical foundations 
of privacy. However, while privacy theory supports a more flexible approach to protecting 
privacy in public places in line with Weller, New Zealand courts are unlikely to follow this 
approach due to doctrinal, constitutional and cultural divergences.  
 
(a) Evaluation of the Hosking approach  
 
The Hosking unwillingness to recognise privacy in public places is based on unreliable 
precedent and an erroneous understanding of privacy’s theoretical underpinnings. The 
majority judgment, delivered by Gault and Blanchard JJ, based the tort of privacy on the 
avoidance of emotional harm. Unlike the United Kingdom misuse of private information 
action, the Hosking tort requires that publication be “highly offensive to the reasonable 
person”.80 This additional element reflects the majority’s view that the evasion of 
humiliation and distress is the central rationale for privacy protection. According to the 
Judges, “the concern is with publicity that is truly humiliating and distressful or otherwise 
harmful to the individual concerned.”81 
 
  
77 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [156].  
78 At [65].  
79 At [172].  
80 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [127].  
81 At [126].  
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First, the limitation of the Hosking tort to emotional harm is founded on questionable legal 
precedent. Gault and Blanchard JJ cited New Zealand High Court and Court of Appeal 
cases involving embarrassing or intimate publications, such as revelations of serious 
criminal convictions and psychiatric treatment.82 While these cases demonstrate the need 
for a privacy tort, confining the tort to such cases cannot be justified solely based on their 
precedent, as they do not in themselves establish why the tort should be so confined.   
 
Moreover, the Court referenced the United States privacy tort in justifying confining 
privacy protection to emotional harm. In the United States, publication must be “highly 
offensive to the reasonable person” in order to qualify for privacy protection.83 In endorsing 
this approach, the Judges failed to acknowledge constitutional differences between the 
United States and New Zealand, particularly regarding the centrality of freedom of speech 
to the United States Constitution. Finally, the Judges cited the English Court of Appeal 
case of Campbell v MGN Ltd, which similarly contained a highly offensive limb.84 
However, this highly offensive element was overturned by the House of Lords on appeal.85  
 
In addition to citing unreliable legal precedent, Gault and Blanchard JJ failed to correctly 
identify the theoretical basis of the right to privacy. As explored in part II of this paper, 
privacy is primarily valued for its role in protecting human autonomy and dignity. Privacy 
enables individuals to live “a life of their choosing” and affords them “equal entitlement… 
to respect.”86  
 
Given privacy’s role in supporting these core human values, theorists suggest that an 
invasion of one’s privacy does not necessarily require tangible harm.87 Instead, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the normative and legal rights to privacy.88 Rather than 
forming the underlying basis of the right to privacy, harm is merely a method by which one 
can limit the ambit of the legal right to privacy or assess the amount of damages which 
should be awarded to the plaintiff.89 In appearing to limit privacy’s value to the avoidance 
of harm, Gault and Blanchard JJ therefore fail to appreciate its true value.  
 
  
82 Tucker v News Media Ownership [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (CA); P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC).   
83 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [68].   
84 Naomi Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] 2 WLR 80.  
85 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 53, at [22].  
86 Law Commission, above n 7, at 5.  
87 At [19] and [188]; Edward J Bloustein, above n 21, at 169-170. 
88 Law Commission, above n 7, at 10.  
89 At [19]; Edward J Bloustein, above n 21, at 169-170.  
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Indeed, the inclusion of a “highly offensive” element in Hosking has been criticised on the 
basis of this theoretical critique. First, the House of Lords in Campbell considered 
autonomy and dignity to be the basis for the United Kingdom tort of misuse of private 
information.90 In so doing, the House of Lords in Campbell criticised the Hosking highly 
offensive limb, stating that offensiveness should not be relevant in deciding whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, as an expectation can arise independently of 
tangible harm.91 Instead, the extent of harm was considered relevant in determining the 
weight to be given to privacy vis à vis freedom of expression in the ultimate balancing 
exercise between arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR.92  
 
This critique was noted by Elias CJ in an obiter discussion in the Supreme Court decision 
in Rogers v TVNZ.93 Moreover, Tipping J in Hosking rejected the majority’s formulation 
of the tort of privacy insofar as “highly offensive” occupies a separate limb.94 While the 
highly offensive limb is a “useful reminder that relatively trivial invasions of privacy 
should not be actionable”, it may be “unduly restrictive” to require harm at this level for 
every invasion of privacy.95  
 
This suggests that the Hosking tort is overly-narrow, given its foundations on unreliable 
precedent and limited theoretical analysis. The highly offensive limb precludes New 
Zealand courts from following Weller in protecting a plaintiff’s right to privacy in a wide 
variety of public situations. This is particularly problematic given the following theoretical 
advantages of the Weller approach.  
 
(b) Evaluation of the Weller approach 
 
(i) Advantages of Weller  
 
In contrast to the aforementioned theoretical issues with the Hosking reasoning, Weller’s 
rationale for protecting some innocuous activities in public places accords with the 
theoretical justifications for privacy explored in the part II of this paper. In justifying 
finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in Weller, Dingemans J primarily cited concern 
  
90 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 53, at [51].  
91 At [22].  
92 At [22].  
93 Rogers v TVNZ [2007] NZSC 91, (2011) NZULR 386 at [25].  
94 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [256].  
95 At [256].  
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about the adverse impacts of publication on the claimant’s future activities.96 Conversely, 
Hosking declined to consider the future impact of publication on the claimant, declaring 
that the effect of publication on the plaintiffs’ future activities was irrelevant in 
adjudicating the particular claim at issue.97  
 
Nevertheless, the Weller consideration of the adverse impact of publication on a claimants’ 
future recreational activities is supported by privacy theory. First, the consideration reflects 
the subjective nature of privacy. As explored above, Moreham defines privacy subjectively 
as control over “desired inaccess” or freedom from the “unwanted access” of others.98 In 
Weller, Murray and von Hannover (No 1), the courts were particularly concerned about 
future media intrusion in the light of the claimants’ public prominence. All claimants were 
“hounded” by the paparazzi on a daily basis.99 As a result of this constant media attention, 
these figures would likely possess a greater desire for privacy. While an ordinary person 
would likely be unconcerned about the publication of an innocuous photo of themselves in 
a public place, permitting the publication of such photographs in the context of these public 
figures enables their continuing surveillance by media. Therefore, in evaluating the adverse 
impact of publication on the particular claimant, the Weller approach appreciates that 
privacy needs vary according to the subjective position of the claimant.   
 
Second, Dingemans J’s consideration of a publication’s impact on future activities reflects 
the grounding of the right to privacy in autonomy. According to theorists, privacy is an 
essential precondition to human autonomy.100 Privacy insulates individuals from the 
negative judgements of others, and thereby enables individuals to live in accordance with 
their own beliefs without concern for external behavioural norms.101  
 
The Weller concern for the impact of publication on future activities extends privacy 
protection to claimants on the basis that modern media practices substantially affect their 
autonomy. As Thompson observes, the “infotainment” media “pursue and capture images 
of celebrities, regardless of their location or activities.”102 Actress Sienna Miller describes 
  
96 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [65].  
97 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [161].  
98 Nicole Moreham, above n 11, at 617.  
99 Von Hannover v Germany, above n 68, at [44]; Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [161]; 
Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, above n 69, at [55].  
100 Katherine Laura Thompson, above n 29, at 6.  
101 Law Commission, above n 7, at [86].  
102 Katherine Laura Thompson, above n 29, at 48.  
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being “relentlessly pursued by about ten to fifteen men almost daily.”103 This constant 
observation prevents public figures from maintaining a private “zone of interaction” in 
public, within which they can behave autonomously. As acknowledged in von Hannover 
(No 1), this absence of autonomy stunts personal development.104 Permitting the 
publication of innocuous photographs therefore has considerable impacts on individual 
autonomy, as it maintains the commercial incentive for the debilitating observation of 
public figures’ daily lives. Therefore, in assessing the impact of publicity on a claimant’s 
future activities, the Weller approach recognises the relationship between privacy and 
autonomy.   
 
(ii) Justifications for diverging from the Weller approach 
 
Despite the apparent theoretical advantages of the Weller approach to privacy in public 
places, New Zealand courts may decline to extend privacy protection to innocuous 
activities in public places in the light of the reasoning in Weller, and constitutional and 
factual divergences between New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  
 
Weller reasoning 
 
Arguably, Weller should be confined to cases involving child claimants, as it does not cite 
sufficient authority to justify a general extension of the misuse of private information action 
to everyday public activities.  
 
First, while Weller cited Murray in justifying finding a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the claimants’ case, Murray cannot be employed as authority for a general broadening 
of the misuse of private information action to innocuous public activities. Murray was a 
summary judgment, and therefore did not fully endorse the appellants’ arguments, instead 
accepting that they had an arguable case. Further, the Court of Appeal in Murray 
distinguished itself from Campbell and von Hannover (No 1) on the basis that Murray 
concerned a child claimant.105  As a result, David Hoffman argues that Murray provides 
lower United Kingdom courts with direction regarding innocuous public activities and 
  
103 “Leveson Enquiry: Actress Sienna Miller gives evidence” (24 November 2011) British Broadcasting 
Company <www.bbc.com>.  
104 Von Hannover v Germany, above n 68, at [55].  
105 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, above n 69, at [47].  
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child claimants, but has little application to non-child claimants.106 This suggests that 
Weller precedent should be confined to cases involving children.  
 
Similarly, von Hannover (No 1) does not provide sufficient authority to justify a general 
extension of the misuse of private information action to cover innocuous activities in public 
places. The House of Lords case of Campbell conflicts with von Hannover (No 1), in 
precluding recognition of privacy in public places, except in humiliating or traumatising 
situations. However, the extent to which the English courts are entitled to depart from the 
Campbell approach in favour of von Hannover (No 1) remains unclear.  
 
In Weller, Dingemans J claimed that lower courts are free to follow ECtHR jurisprudence, 
as domestic law in the privacy sphere is based on the ECHR.107 However, the basis of 
United Kingdom privacy law on arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR does not automatically enable 
lower courts to depart from domestic precedent. Commentators argue that the English 
courts do not have an absolute obligation to apply ECtHR jurisprudence in the privacy 
sphere, but are merely required to follow the ECtHR’s general principles.108 According to 
Alconbury, excessive adherence to ECtHR decisions would dangerously alter the United 
Kingdom constitution in favour of the judiciary, given that adherence would involve drastic 
judicial changes usually reserved for legislative amendment.109 Moreover, the ECtHR has 
recently emphasised the margin of appreciation afforded to states in the privacy context.110 
Nevertheless, Hoffman argues that this debate solely applies to superior courts, as it is a 
“matter of clear law” that lower courts must decline to follow ECtHR decisions where they 
conflict with superior domestic courts’ precedent.111 This challenges Weller’s apparent 
assumption that ECtHR cases can be employed to determine the content of arts 8 and 10 in 
the United Kingdom context. This suggests that von Hannover (No 1) cannot be used as 
authority to justify a domestic departure from Campbell’s approach to public places.  
 
Nevertheless, following Murray, the Court in Weller is free to diverge from the Campbell 
aversion to protecting innocuous public activities in the context of children. As Hoffman 
notes, Murray provides ample authority to steer lower courts toward protecting children in 
  
106 David Hoffman The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 
United Kingdom, 2011) at 145. 
107 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [26].  
108 David Hoffman, above n 106, at 141-142.  
109 Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23, [2001] 2 All ER 929 at [76] per Hoffman LJ.  
110 Von Hannover v Germany, above n 68, at [104].  
111 David Hoffman, above n 106, at 141.   
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these cases.112 This suggests that New Zealand courts should only regard Weller as 
authority in for an extension of privacy law in cases involving child claimants.  
 
Constitutional divergence 
 
In addition, the New Zealand courts may decline to follow the Weller approach to 
protecting privacy in public places in the light of constitutional divergences between New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom.  
 
First, New Zealand courts may refuse to follow English privacy jurisprudence in the light 
of the influence of EtCHR jurisprudence on United Kingdom privacy law. In Hosking, the 
Court of Appeal claimed that the English common law framework for privacy protection 
was essentially equivalent to the New Zealand approach.113 However, since Hosking was 
decided, United Kingdom privacy jurisprudence has significantly broadened under the 
influence of the ECtHR.   
 
While the previous discussion indicates that the proper extent to which the ECtHR should 
influence United Kingdom jurisprudence remains contentious, it is clear that art 8 case law 
has triggered the post-Hosking expansion of English privacy law. According to Reklos v 
Greece, art 8 has broad coverage, and encompasses “the right to identity”, “the right to 
personal development” and “the right to protect one’s image”.114 In Campbell, the House 
of Lords cited this extensive scope as instrumental in the decision to broaden domestic 
privacy protection.115  
 
Moreover, the ECtHR’s decision in von Hannover (No 1) has been particularly influential 
in the context of Murray and Weller. Prior to von Hannover (No 1), United Kingdom law 
did not cover innocuous daily activities carried out in public. 116 In McKennitt v Ash, the 
Court of Appeal noted that von Hannover (No 1) “extends the reach of article 8 beyond 
what had previously been understood” in recognising that such activities could attract art 
8 protection.117 While Murray purported to distinguish itself from both von Hannover (No 
  
112 David Hoffman, above n 106, at 145.  
113 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [90].  
114 Case C-1234/05 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece [2009] ECHR 200 at [39].   
115 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 53, at [16].  
116 At [154].  
117 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2007] 3 WLR 194 at [37].  
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1) and Campbell on the basis that neither case involved children,118 the decision to 
recognise the protection of innocuous activities in the context of children is undoubtedly 
prompted by von Hannover (No 1). Indeed, Murray cited von Hannover (No 1) in justifying 
its approach to privacy in public places.119 The considerable influence of the ECtHR on 
United Kingdom jurisprudence suggests that New Zealand courts should treat post-
Hosking English privacy developments with caution.  
 
Moreover, New Zealand courts are wary of accepting an over-expansive definition of 
privacy in accordance with European jurisprudence due to the constitutional weight 
attached to freedom of expression. Unlike the United Kingdom, New Zealand does not 
have a codified right to privacy. The legislature declined to codify a general right to privacy 
in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA), noting that the boundaries were “too 
uncertain and contentious”.120 Conversely, freedom of expression is recognised in 
NZBORA.121 As a result of this discrepancy, the Judges in Hosking were cautious about 
curtailing freedom of expression in favour of privacy considerations. The majority’s 
narrowly-defined tort reflects concerns that the freedom of expression must not be 
overridden unless the limitation is “demonstrably justified” in accordance with s 5 of the 
NZBORA.122 Further, Keith and Anderson JJ argued that a tort of privacy would be an 
unjustified limitation on freedom of expression, as its ill-defined boundaries will cause a 
“chilling effect” on freedom of expression.123 Moreover, Anderson J described freedom of 
expression as the “first and last trench in the protection of liberty”.124 The importance 
placed on freedom of expression in Hosking indicates that New Zealand courts would be 
reluctant to adopt United Kingdom privacy developments, and would view Weller’s 
protection of innocuous public activities as dangerous for freedom of expression.  
    
Cultural divergence 
 
Moreover, New Zealand courts may decline to follow the treatment of public activities in 
Weller as a result of differences in media and celebrity cultures between the jurisdictions. 
The media cultures in New Zealand and the United Kingdom give rise to different levels 
  
118 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, above n 69, at [47].  
119 At [55].   
120 Ministry of Justice, above n 6, at [10.144].  
121 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14.  
122 Section 5.  
123 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [208]-[222].  
124 At [267].  
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of privacy concern. In Hosking, the majority described the claimants’ fears of “constant 
media intrusion” as “overstated”.125 The English Court of Appeal in Murray criticised this 
observation, instead claiming that the parents’ fears for their children’s autonomy were 
“entirely reasonable and should be protected by law.”126 However, one could argue that the 
Court of Appeal was correct in dismissing the Hoskings’ concerns in the light of the New 
Zealand media environment. Paparazzi-style media tactics permeate the English media 
industry.127 In contrast, the media practice of pursuing of prominent individuals is not 
prevalent in New Zealand, and such tactics are limited to few photographers.128  Indeed, 
legal commentator Alan Ringwood argues that the need to the activities of the 
“papparrazzi” identified in the United Kingdom Leveson enquiry does not arise in the New 
Zealand media context.129  
 
Similarly, the divergence between Hosking and Weller can be partly explained by 
differences between celebrity cultures in the two jurisdictions. The claimants in Hosking 
and Weller may be distinguished on the basis of their level of public profile. Paul Weller 
was described by the Dingemans J as a “well-known musician.”130 On the other hand, the 
Court of Appeal used quotation marks to describe Mr Hosking as a “celebrity”, suggesting 
that the Court may have doubted his public prominence.131  Indeed, one could argue that 
“celebrities” in the New Zealand environment experience a lesser degree of intrusion into 
their personal lives than those in the United Kingdom as a result of a more restrained media 
culture.  
 
In the light of New Zealand’s media and celebrity culture, courts are unlikely to perceive 
significant threats to an individual’s autonomy as a result of an incident of media attention.  
As the need to protect individuals from a “constant fear of media attention” is unlikely to 
arise to the same extent as in Europe, New Zealand courts may not perceive a need to 
extend the Hosking tort to cover everyday activities for “celebrity” claimants.   
 
  
125 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [162].  
126 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, above n 69, at [50].  
127 For example: “Leveson Enquiry: Actress Sienna Miller gives evidence”, above n 103.    
128 Sunday Star Times “Lorde pushes back against being papped” (11 May 2014) Stuff.co.nz 
<www.stuff.co.nz>.  
129 Alan Ringwood “Crucial to protect press freedom” (5 December 2012) New Zealand Herald 
<www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
130 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [1].  
131 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [9].  
26 
 
(c) Conclusion: to what extent should Weller prompt a reconsideration of the Hosking 
approach to public places?  
 
The Weller extension of privacy protection to cover some innocuous activities in public 
places should trigger a reconsideration of the theoretical basis of the Hosking tort. The 
Weller approach is theoretically sound, as it recognises the subjective nature of privacy and 
the relationship between privacy and autonomy. In contrast, Hosking’s inclusion of a 
“highly offensive” limb in the tort of privacy appears to erroneously suggest that privacy 
is founded on the avoidance of emotional harm.   
 
However, New Zealand courts may nevertheless be justified in declining to extend privacy 
protection to innocuous public activities. First, Weller only provides precedent for such an 
extension in the context of children. Moreover, New Zealand courts should be reluctant to 
follow post-Hosking English privacy developments as a result of the significant influence 
of the ECtHR, and the apparent centrality of freedom of expression to the New Zealand 
constitution. Finally, cultural divergences between the jurisdictions suggests that there may 
no genuine need to expand the Hosking tort along European lines given the docile nature 
of the New Zealand media and celebrity environment.  
B  Public profiles 
 
This section explores the divergent English and New Zealand approaches to individuals 
with public profiles. The courts differ in determining the extent to which public prominence 
should reduce a person’s expectations of privacy, and conversely increase the weight 
afforded to the media’s freedom of expression. This paper contends Hosking places 
excessive emphasis on the public status of a plaintiff, a position which is not supported by 
legitimate freedom of expression considerations. The paper further argues that the ECtHR’s 
approach to public figures could provide a legitimate alternative for New Zealand courts, 
but must be carefully demarcated to avoid a chilling effect on freedom of expression.  
1 Case analysis 
 
Hosking and the United Kingdom courts have presented contrasting views on the extent to 
which a claimant’s public profile should impact on the strength of his or her privacy claim.   
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(a) Hosking 
 
Hosking stated that the public profile of a plaintiff has significant implications for both the 
plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the media’s countervailing freedom of 
expression claims.  
 
(i) Reasonable expectation of privacy  
 
The Court held that the classification of a plaintiff as a “public figure” triggers a reduced 
expectation of privacy. According to Gault and Blanchard JJ, the term “public figure” 
encompasses a wide range of individuals, who;132 
 
…engage in public activities, assume a prominent role in institutions or activities 
having general economic, cultural, social or similar public interest, or submit 
themselves or their work for public judgment.  
 
While Hosking accepted that public figures do not generally forfeit the right to privacy by 
virtue of their public prominence, they nevertheless have generally-reduced expectations 
of privacy. Gault and Blanchard JJ cited the following three factors which justify 
diminishing public figures’ reasonable expectations of privacy.133   
 
Voluntary public figures   
 
First, the Judges stated that voluntary public figures implicitly accept reduced privacy 
rights as a “necessary corollary” of their pursuit of public prominence. According to 
Prosser, voluntary public figures have lesser expectations of privacy as “by seeking 
publicity they have consented to it.”134  
 
Prior publications 
 
Second, Hosking held that public figures have reduced expectations of privacy as their 
private information may already be in the public domain. In the Hoskings’ case, the 
plaintiffs had been “open and willing” to discuss Mrs Hosking’s pregnancy in several 
  
132 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [121].  
133 At [120].  
134 At [120].  
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magazine articles.135 This placing of the twin’s birth in the “spotlight” reduced the 
children’s expectations of privacy.136   
 
Public interest in publication 
 
Third, the majority considered that public figures have diminished expectations of privacy 
as a result of legitimate public interest in their affairs.137 The Court defined “public interest” 
widely, encompassing the public’s “natural curiosity and interest […] in the personal lives 
and activities of the [public figure].” 138  
 
Moreover, the Court asserted that legitimate public interest extends to the lives of public 
figures’ families.139 This was considered a “necessary corollary” of the public figures’ 
reduced expectations of privacy.140 In support of this contention, the Court cited the United 
States case of Kapellas v Kofman. In this case, the disclosure of a politician’s children’s 
criminal convictions was deemed to fall within the scope of legitimate public interest.141 
The United States court maintained that the children’s diminished privacy was “one of the 
costs of the retention of a free marketplace of ideas.”142 In the light of Kapellas, Gault and 
Blanchard JJ held that there was legitimate public interest in the twins’ photographs by 
virtue of their relationship with their celebrity parents. This further reduced the children’s 
expectations of privacy.143 
 
(b) United Kingdom  
 
The English courts’ approach to publically prominent claimants remains unclear. However, 
unlike Hosking, recent decisions suggest that the courts are less willing to accept that a 
claimant’s public profile reduces his or her privacy claims and increases the media’s 
freedom of expression rights.    
 
 
  
135 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [9].  
136 At [123].  
137 At [120].  
138 At [120], citing Randerson J’s High Court judgment.   
139 At [124].  
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142 At [122].  
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(i) Reasonable expectation of privacy  
 
Voluntary public figures 
 
Unlike Hosking, the United Kingdom courts have not made a clear distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary public figures. In Campbell, the Court held that the claimant’s 
symbiotic relationship with the media had little relevance beyond the aforementioned 
impact of prior publications. According to Hoffman LJ: 144   
 
A person may attract or even seek publicity about some aspects of his or her life 
without creating any public interest in the publication of personal information about 
other matters.  
 
Moreover, while Weller cited von Hannover (No 1) in informing its approach to claimants 
with public profiles, Dingemans J did not consider it necessary to distinguish between the 
somewhat voluntary nature of musician Paul Weller’s public profile and the involuntary 
public prominence acquired by Princess Caroline in von Hannover (No 1). This suggests 
that the English courts do not recognise the Hosking distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary public figures.  
 
Prior publications 
 
In accordance with Hosking, Weller accepted that previous voluntary publications can 
reduce a claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Dingemans J cited the United 
Kingdom Court of Appeal case of McKennitt v Ash, which held that previous voluntary 
disclosures of personal information can diminish a person’s right to privacy.145 However, 
McKennitt insisted that privacy would only be reduced in relation to the specific disclosure, 
and did not give rise to a forfeiture of privacy claims in relation to other personal 
information.146  
 
In Weller, the Court found that previous publications about the claimants offered by the 
claimants’ parents did not reduce the children’s expectations of privacy in relation to the 
photographs at issue, as full images of the twins’ faces had not yet been published.147 
  
144 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 53, at [57].   
145 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [71].  
146 McKennitt v Ash, above n 117, at [55].   
147 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [179].  
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(ii) Ultimate balancing test 
 
The extent to which a claimant’s public profile boosts the media’s freedom of expression 
claims in the context of the “ultimate balancing test” is unclear. As mentioned in part III, 
the second limb of the United Kingdom misuse of private information tort requires the 
courts to balance a claimant’s art 8 privacy rights with the media’s art 10 freedom of 
expression claims.  
 
The conflicting approaches to this question, set out in A v B and von Hannover (No 1), have 
not yet been conclusively reconciled by the United Kingdom courts. While A v B held that 
a claimant’s public prominence automatically increases the weight afforded to freedom of 
expression, von Hannover (No 1) stated that an individual’s public profile does not increase 
the significance of the media’s freedom of expression claims unless the publication 
contributes to a “debate of general interest”.  
 
A v B 
 
First, the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in A v B held that a claimant’s public profile 
generates legitimate public interest in his or her personal life, which bolsters the media’s 
freedom of expression claims. A v B defined “public figures” as “all those who play a role 
in public life”, encompassing persons in the political, social, economic and artistic 
spheres.148 The Court held that the media have elevated freedom of expression claims when 
reporting on public figures. According to the Court: 149 
 
A public figure is entitled to a private life. The individual, however, should recognise 
that because of his public position he must expect and accept that his actions will be 
more closely scrutinised by the media. Even trivial facts relating to a public figure can 
be of great interest to readers and other observers of the media. 
 
This suggests that public interest in publication extends to private information about public 
figures which is of mere curiosity to the general public. This accords with the Hosking 
approach.150  
  
148 A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2002] 3 WLR 542 at [11].  
149 At [11].  
150 This case was a cited in justifying the Hosking approach to public figures. See: Hosking v Runting, above 
n 1, at [121]. 
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Von Hannover (No 1) 
 
The ECtHR in von Hannover (No 1) adopted a contrasting approach to A v B. The Court 
recognised a “fundamental distinction” between:151 
 
Reporting facts… capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating 
to politicians in the exercise of their functions… and reporting details of the private 
life of an individual who… does not exercise official functions. 
 
As a result, the Court confined the definition of a “public figure” to individuals exercising 
official functions.152 Despite public curiosity about the Princess Caroline’s private life as a 
result of her royal status, the claimant did not exercise any official function on behalf of 
the state of Monaco, and therefore was not a public figure.153  
 
Moreover, the ECtHR held that freedom of expression will only be given weight where a 
publication about a public figure “contributes to a debate of general interest.”154 A “debate 
of general interest” appears confined to political speech, and does not encompass 
publications created merely to satisfy “the curiosity of a particular readership”.155 
According to Barendt, this definition is normative, as it relates to information which the 
public ought to know, as opposed to information that the public actually wants to know.156 
 
Von Hannover (No 2) 
 
However, the ECtHR’s decision in Von Hannover (No 2) modified the von Hannover (No 
1) position to some extent. First, the Court doubted its distinction between private 
individuals and public figures in von Hannover (No 1), which was based on the exercise of 
official functions. The Court held that the public profile of Princess Caroline meant that 
she could not be regarded as a private individual, regardless of the fact that she did not 
exercise official functions.157  
 
  
151 Von Hannover v Germany, above n 68, at [63].  
152 At [72].  
153 At [72].  
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Moreover, the ECtHR emphasised states’ margin of appreciation in defining a “debate of 
general interest”, suggesting that states are not obliged to limit the concept to political 
matters.  In so doing, the Court considered that the German courts were entitled to find that 
a newspaper article concerning the ill-health of Monaco’s Prince Rainer contributed to a 
debate of general interest.158  
 
McKennitt v Ash 
 
In McKennitt, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the positions in A v B and von 
Hannover (No 1) could not be reconciled.159 However, McKennitt held that A v B was not 
binding authority in the context of the misuse of private information action, as the case was 
decided under the pre-Campbell breach of confidence action.160 Therefore, A v B does not 
appear to preclude lower courts from applying von Hannover (No 1) under the misuse of 
private information action.161 Indeed, Barendt claims that the von Hannover (No 1) decision 
will prompt United Kingdom courts to depart from A v B.162 However, in the light of the 
margin of appreciation and von Hannover (No 2), the extent to which von Hannover (No 
1) will influence the United Kingdom courts’ approach to publically prominent claimants 
is unclear.  
 
Weller 
 
In Weller, Dingemans J did not expressly address the tension between the von Hannover 
decisions and A v B, and thereby offered little to clarification of the United Kingdom courts’ 
approach to public figures under the misuse of private information tort.  
 
In undertaking the ultimate balancing exercise, Dingemans J appeared to adopt the von 
Hannover (No 1) conception of a “debate of general interest”.163 The Judge considered that 
the particular photographs at issue did not contribute to a debate of general interest, despite 
the considerable public profile of the claimants’ parents.164 Given that these photographs 
would likely have satisfied the public interest definition in A v B, given the public curiosity 
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in Paul Weller’s family life, Weller employed a more confined definition of “general 
interest” in line with the ECtHR.  
 
However, Dingemans J’s concern for the potential consequences of prohibiting publication 
on the British newspaper industry suggests that the Court does not fully adopt the von 
Hannover (No 1) approach. Despite failing to contribute to a debate of general interest, the 
Judge stated that the Weller photographs should nevertheless be given freedom of 
expression weight as there is general public interest in having a “thriving and vigorous 
newspaper industry.”165 The ability to publish matters of popular appeal was considered 
central to the commercial flourishing of the media. According to the Court, this commercial 
viability is essential to upholding the media’s role as a “public watchdog” on democracy.166 
However, despite acknowledging the merit in this argument, Dingemans J considered that 
the media’s interest did not outweigh the children’s right to privacy in the Weller’s case.167  
2 To what extent should the United Kingdom and ECtHR jurisprudence prompt a 
reconsideration of the Hosking approach to individuals with public profiles?  
 
While the previous case summary highlights uncertainties in the English approach to 
claimants with public profiles, the narrow conception of the media’s legitimate public 
interest advanced in von Hannover (No 1) highlights shortcomings in the Hosking 
reasoning.  
 
(a) Evaluation of the Hosking approach 
 
The Hosking assertion that a plaintiff’s public profile significantly decreases their 
reasonable expectations of privacy and bolsters the media’s freedom of expression claims 
has some legitimacy, but is overly-broad.   
 
(i) Reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
Voluntary public figures 
 
First, the Court of Appeal’s claim in Hosking that “voluntary” public figures have lesser 
expectations of privacy is supported by Moreham. Moreham argues that the involuntary 
  
165 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [76].  
166 At [73].  
167 At [183].  
34 
 
nature of an event should be relevant in determining whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists. A claimant’s expectation of privacy is more reasonable where an event has 
been caused by his or her voluntary actions as opposed to the situation arising 
involuntarily.168 For instance, a person should have a greater right to privacy in relation to 
a public heart attack than a naked streak in public.169 Applying Moreham’s logic, voluntary 
public figures are arguably less entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy vis à vis 
involuntary figures, as increased public scrutiny of their lives partly results from their own 
decision to enter the public arena. While it may be difficult to draw a definitive line between 
“voluntary” and “involuntary” public figures, due to differing degrees of openness and 
courting of the media, one can nevertheless distinguish between a royal figure such as 
Princess Caroline of Monaco, whose public status was conferred at birth, and the conscious 
decisions of Paul Weller and Mike Hosking to pursue public careers.  As noted above, 
Weller failed to acknowledge this distinction.  
 
Prior publications 
 
Second, the Hosking contention that voluntary prior publications about an individual 
reduce his or her reasonable expectations of privacy is supported by the English courts. 
Campbell and McKennitt accepted that the authorised publication of personal information 
reduces a person’s subsequent reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of that matter. 
This notion is consistent with the objective requirement of the privacy test in both New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, namely that a claimant must have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Where a person has consented to putting their personal information 
in the public domain, it seems unreasonable to later insist upon privacy rights in relation to 
the disclosures. Indeed, the parties in Campbell agreed that it was unreasonable for the 
claimant to insist on privacy protection for her drug habit, given that the she had previously 
offered information to the media on this subject.170  
 
Nevertheless, Hosking and Weller have different conceptions about the extent to which 
prior publications reduce an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. In Hosking, 
the parents had agreed to several magazine articles detailing Mrs Hosking’s IVF 
pregnancy, but refused to disclose information after the twins’ birth.171 According to the 
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Court, “the fact that the Hoskings had placed the fact of their children’s pending birth in 
the public light must have objectively diminished expectations of privacy”.172  
 
In Weller, the claimants’ parents had disclosed a “considerable amount of information” 
relating to their children prior to the publication of the photographs at issue.173 Paul Weller 
had spoken about the twins in magazine interviews, photographs of the twins taken from a 
distance had been posted online and the 16 year old claimant had been the subject of a Teen 
Vogue photo-shoot. In contrast to Hosking, Weller considered that these publications did 
not diminish the children’s expectations of privacy, as “photographs showing the faces of 
the children on an afternoon out with their father had not previously been published.”174  
 
Weller therefore suggests that previous publications will only be relevant insofar as the 
subject matter of the publication is almost identical to a previous disclosure. On the other 
hand, Hosking considers that merely placing the “fact” of the children’s birth in the 
spotlight is sufficient to reduce privacy entitlements.  
 
The Hosking approach arguably applies an overly-broad characterisation of the previous 
disclosures to the detriment of the Hoskings’ privacy rights. The subject of the magazine 
articles in Hosking, namely the claimant’s IVF pregnancy, was not closely related to the 
events recorded in the photographs. While the magazine articles would likely have 
permitted the media to publish articles concerning Mrs Hosking’s future pregnancies, the 
articles cannot be said to have given the media carte blanche to publish any information 
about the twins. This is particularly evident given the Hoskings’ refusal to engage with the 
media after the twins’ birth.  
 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hosking to recognise diminished privacy 
rights as a result of the magazine articles does not accord with privacy theory. The theorists 
cited in part II of this paper argue that privacy protects a person’s ability to control the 
degree of personal information which one reveals to the public. Under the Hosking 
approach, the decision to disclose information about one subject would lead to a loss of 
control over personal information relating to related subjects. This suggests that the Weller 
approach is more consistent with privacy theory, as it carefully confines the impact of the 
disclosures in order to avoid undermining the claimants’ privacy rights.    
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(ii) “Legitimate public interest” 
 
The Hosking claim that legitimate public interest extends to the public’s “natural curiosity” 
in public figures’ lives is not strongly supported by freedom of expression rationales 
outlined in part II.  
 
Argument from truth  
 
The argument from truth is not compelling in the context of purely personal information. 
As discussed in part II, the argument from truth claims that open and public discussion of 
ideas facilitates the discovery of the best or most useful information.  
 
First, this argument assumes that the discovery of truth is the “highest public good”, which 
must necessarily take priority over competing interests.175 Freedom of expression 
proponents argue that the discovering the truth is either intrinsically valuable, or valuable 
due to its facilitation of well-informed decisions leading to social progress.176 Nevertheless, 
many legal systems opt to suppress true speech in the light of arguably more compelling 
social concerns.177 As Barendt notes, restrictions on the publication of personal information 
are justified where the need to protect the right to privacy is more compelling than the need 
to discover of the truth. Indeed, where the societal benefit obtained from discovering the 
“truth” about personal information is a mere satisfaction of public curiosity, the claimant’s 
privacy interests will likely outweigh this benefit.   
 
Second, Mill’s theory and the marketplace of ideas theory are not very applicable in the 
context of purely personal information such as the Hosking photographs. Mill’s argument 
assumes that the government will only prohibit information on the grounds that it is false, 
under an assumption of infallibility. However, the government may have other grounds for 
prohibiting speech beyond veracity concerns. In prohibiting the publication of personal 
information, the government accepts that the information is true, but nevertheless prohibits 
its publication based on concerns about the impact of publication on the individual 
concerned. As a result, Barendt concludes that Mill’s theory “applies most clearly to speech 
stating beliefs and theories about political, moral, aesthetic, and social matters”, and has 
little application in the context of personal information.178  
  
175 Eric Barendt, above n 39, at 8.  
176 At 7.  
177 At 8.  
178 At 10-11. 
37 
 
 
Similarly, the marketplace of ideas theory is based on a mistrust of government regulation 
of the speech market. According to Barendt, a preference for marketplace regulation over 
government regulation is most compelling where there is legitimate suspicion of 
government regulation, such as in the context of political speech.179 However, where 
speech has no political relevance, Barendt claims that a democratically-elected government 
should have power to regulate the marketplace, just as occurs in the economic sphere.180 
Indeed, the self-interested and commercially-motivated nature of the modern media 
suggests that such entities are primarily driven by profit, and not wholly committed to 
discovering the “truth”. This suggests that a democratically-elected government should 
play a role in regulating the speech market, given that self-regulation by the media could 
be self-serving. 
 
These critiques of the argument from truth highlight errors in the Hosking reasoning. 
Hosking claimed that the marketplace of ideas theory supported the publication of personal 
information about public figures. In support of this contention, Gault and Blanchard JJ 
cited Kapellas, a case concerning the publication of a politician’s children’s criminal 
convictions.181 The Court in Kapellas noted that “the children’s loss of privacy is one of 
the costs of the retention of a free marketplace of ideas.”182 However, in using Kapellas as 
a justification for reduced expectations of privacy in the Hosking factual context, the Judges 
failed to appreciate the political context of the Kapellas decision.  
 
As noted above, the argument from truth is more compelling in the context of political 
information for several reasons. As noted above, the quest for truth in relation to political 
information is more valuable to society than in the purely personal sphere. Moreover, there 
is considerably more justification for being suspicious about government regulation in the 
political context vis à vis information with no political implications. As the Kapellas 
information has political character, the argument from truth is more compelling in this 
context than in relation to the innocuous photographs at issue in Hosking. This suggests 
that Hosking erroneously employed Kapellas to justify extending legitimate public interest 
to cover non-political information.   
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Self-fulfilment and autonomy argument 
 
The self-fulfilment and autonomy argument is similarly unconvincing in justifying the 
wide definition of legitimate public interest in Hosking. First, the self-fulfilment argument 
contends that restrictions on the freedom to impart ideas limits the personal growth the 
speaker or writer.183 Moreover, Scanlon’s autonomy thesis asserts that government 
regulation infringes on individuals’ autonomy, as it inhibits individuals’ abilities to make 
decisions by independently weighing competing ideas.184  
 
These arguments are problematic in the context of personal information disclosed by the 
media solely to satisfy public curiosity. First, the speaker argument appears limited to 
human speakers, given that the process of personal growth is intrinsically human. 
According to Barendt, the suggestion that the media can experience personal growth is 
“far-fetched”.185  
 
Second, neither the speaker nor the recipient theory justifies why freedom of expression is 
particularly conducive to self-fulfilment and autonomy vis à vis other rights. In accordance 
with the privacy theory discussion, one could argue that privacy has an equally valid claim 
to facilitating self-fulfilment and autonomy. Moreover, excessive regard to freedom of 
expression at the expense of privacy may in fact inhibit the self-fulfilment of the 
individuals. For instance, in Von Hannover (No 1), the ECtHR found that the persistent 
photographing of Princess Caroline limited the development of her relationships with other 
individuals.186  
 
Third, purely personal information about a public figure does not facilitate the reader’s 
autonomy, as it is unlikely relevant to an individual’s life decisions. The sole purpose of 
imparting or receiving information about a stranger’s private life is usually the satisfaction 
of one’s curiosity. Such information does little to aid a person’s life decisions or the 
formation of moral or political beliefs.  
 
Nevertheless, one could contend that privacy-invading publications may contribute to the 
formation of moral beliefs, in addressing contemporary issues such as drug abuse and body 
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image.187 For instance, the case of Campbell concerned a celebrity seeking treatment for a 
drug addiction. However, Nicholls J in Campbell suggested that such information makes 
less contribution to the public domain than political speech.188 Moreover, the innocuous 
content of the photographs at issue in Hosking would preclude them from falling into this 
contemporary issues category. Nevertheless, A v B contends that public figures function as 
role models for the public, and therefore public interest extends to trivial facts about the 
public figure’s life on which readers may base their own behaviour.189 However, the “role 
model” function of the Hosking photographs is negligible, as they do not appear to provide 
readers with any significant behavioural guidance given their innocuous nature.  
 
Argument from democracy 
  
In addition, the argument from democracy provides little justification for protecting 
innocuous personal information. Meiklejohn contends that freedom of expression is 
primarily designed to protect citizens’ rights to express and receive information relevant to 
self-governance. As Barendt observes, this theory only applies to political speech.190 This 
suggests that personal information will unlikely be justified in reference to Meiklejohn’s 
theory, as such information rarely has relevance to political debate. As Fenwick and 
Phillipson note, this justification will only apply where one’s personal information has 
direct bearing on a political issue, such as the publication of details of a politician’s private 
life affecting his or her fitness for office.191 The theory does not defend the protection of 
apolitical personal information of the kind at issue in Hosking. 
 
However, the constitutional democracy theory could support the definition of legitimate 
public interest advanced in Hosking. This theory asserts that the government should not be 
entrusted with the regulation non-political speech, as affording the government the power 
to define the bounds of political speech would risk the deliberate or inadvertent suppression 
of legitimate public discussion.  
 
The constitutional democracy theory appears to support the media’s right to publish 
personal information. First, concern with entrusting the government with the ability to 
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determine the bounds of political expression is particularly pertinent in the media context. 
As the media’s democratic duty involves criticising politicians, 192 the government would 
have heightened motivations to suppress unfavourable coverage.   
 
Moreover, where personal information is concerned, it is often difficult to draw the line 
between political and non-political expression. Speech which does not appear immediately 
political may have political consequences, such as details of a politician’s extra-marital 
affair. Further, what constitutes a “political issue” is difficult to define. Personal stories are 
often used in articles relating to contemporary issues such as anorexia, obesity and drug 
addiction. Thompson argues that the extent to which these issues can be classified as 
“political” is unclear.193 This argument would support a wide definition of “public interest”, 
as it suggests that the government would be incapable of accurately delineating the bounds 
of political debate.  
 
Nevertheless, the constitutional democracy argument can also be criticised in the context 
of media and personal information. Excessive deference to media self-regulation is 
problematic for democracy. The theory assumes that fruitful democratic debate can occur 
in the absence of state regulation. As a “pillar of democracy”,194 the media is entrusted with 
the role of providing forums for political debate. However, given that modern media are 
primarily commercial, any democracy-enhancing purpose is necessarily subsidiary to their 
motivations to make profit. As a result, the media will publish the information that attracts 
the most readers, displacing political coverage with human interest stories. Permitting the 
publication of such trivial information can therefore undermine the effectiveness of the 
media’s role in facilitating democratic debate. This suggests that an excessively wide 
definition of ‘legitimate public interest’, of the kind advanced by Hosking, may serve to 
undermine democracy.   
 
(b) Evaluation of the ECtHR and United Kingdom approach 
 
In the light of the significant theoretical shortcomings in Hosking’s treatment of individuals 
with public profiles, this section examines the merits of adopting an alternative approach 
in line with the ECtHR and English developments in this area.   
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(i)  “Debate of general interest” 
 
First, the ECtHR’s normative definition of a “debate of general interest”, which is partly 
adopted in Weller, is supported by House of Lords obiter and partly bolstered by the 
argument from democracy. In von Hannover (No 1), the ECtHR held that a publication 
should only be given substantial freedom of expression weight where it contributes to a 
“debate of general interest.”  
 
As Barendt notes, the Court defined this concept normatively, encompassing information 
which the public ought to know, as opposed to information which genuinely interests the 
public.195 In so doing, the ECtHR declined to protect personal information unless it was 
“capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society”. 196 For instance, personal 
information about a politician relating to the exercise of his or her functions may qualify.197 
This can be contrasted with Hosking’s interpretation of the analogous concept of 
“legitimate public interest”, which extends to information solely published to satisfy public 
curiosity. While the ECtHR has since emphasised the margin of appreciation afforded to 
states in applying art 8 of the ECHR,198 Weller appears to accept that private information 
published to satisfy public voyeurism cannot contribute to a “debate of general interest.”199  
 
The ECtHR approach has several advantages. First, the normative definition of “general 
interest” is supported by obiter from the House of Lords case of Jameel v Wall. In this case, 
Baroness Hale asserted that there was no “real” public interest in “the most vapid tittle-
tattle about the activities of footballers’ wives and girlfriends [that] interests large sections 
of the public”.200 Instead, Baroness Hale insisted that information which is in the “public 
interest” should not be equated with information which “interests the public”.201  
 
Moreover, the ECtHR’s conception of a debate of general interest accords with the 
argument from democracy as conceived by Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn claims that freedom 
of expression is not an absolute right to say anything at any time, but primarily protects 
competing viewpoints on issues relating to governance.202 This contention supports the 
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ECtHR’s prioritisation of political expression, namely speech “capable of contributing to 
debate in a democratic society”, and their aversion towards protecting non-political 
personal information.  
 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR’s narrow definition of general interest can be criticised using the 
constitutional democracy and autonomy theories. First, the constitutional democracy 
theory suggests that the ECtHR’s characterisation of general interest is overly-narrow. As 
explored above, the constitutional democracy theory contends that parliament and the 
courts should not be entrusted with defining the boundaries of political debate. In the 
confining the general interest to a normative conception of what the public ought to know, 
the court is necessarily making judgements about the boundaries of legitimate political 
debate. This judgement will inevitably be subjective, causing judges to characterise the 
“general interest” in accordance with their own world views. As Hoffman LJ observed in 
R v Central Independent Television, “a freedom which is restricted to what judges think to 
be responsible or in the public interest is no freedom.”203 Indeed, Weller acknowledged that 
restricting the editorial autonomy of the media would undermine their ability to provide an 
open forum for political debate.204 
 
Moreover, as argued above, the difficulty of authoritatively delineating the boundaries of 
“political” information is particularly evident in the context of stories involving personal 
information. Personal information is often presented in “infotainment” stories, which 
primarily intend to entertain their viewers, but may nevertheless have political 
implications.205 For instance, a report on a celebrity’s body image or a politician’s eating 
habits may foremost aim to entertain, but may also contribute to political debate. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to characterise the street scenes at issue in Hosking and Weller 
as contributing to any form of political debate, due to their unremarkable nature. Therefore, 
while the ECtHR exclusion of photographs solely intended to entertain is justifiable, 
excluding “infotainment” publications from the scope of general interest may be 
detrimental to democracy.  
 
Second, the argument from autonomy supports a wider definition of general interest than 
the definition advanced in von Hannover (No 1). As explored in part II, Scanlon’s thesis is 
suspicious of government censorship on the grounds that it inhibits autonomous decision-
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making, as individuals must be entitled weigh up competing ideas independently in order 
to be truly autonomous.  
 
As noted above, the publication of seemingly trivial personal information may increase the 
audience’s ability to make informed lifestyle choices, thereby supporting their autonomy 
under Scanlon’s theory. Fenwick and Phillipson suggest that publications relating to 
sexuality, eating disorders and abortions may assist readers in making various lifestyle 
choices.206 However, this argument would not easily justify the publication of an innocuous 
street scene such as those at issue in Hosking and Weller. While one could argue that a 
street scene could inform viewers’ fashion choices, these decisions appear considerably 
less significant than those listed by Fenwick and Phillipson.  
 
Nevertheless, the Court in A v B and the concurring opinion in von Hannover (No 1) 
supported the contention that even trivial information is capable of contributing to an 
individual’s autonomy. The Court in A v B claimed that even “trivial facts” relating to a 
public figure’s life serve as behavioural guides for readers, given the status of public figures 
as societal role models.207 This contention was supported by the concurring opinion of 
Judge Barrato in von Hannover (No 1). Judge Barrato insisted that the public should be 
allowed the judge the personal behaviour of public figures, as they are “often regarded as 
idols.”208 To the extent that the photographs in Hosking and Weller can be regarded as 
general expressions of celebrity behaviour, this role model argument supports their 
publication. However, given that the children of the well-known figures could not be 
deemed to occupy equivalent role model status, this argument would not extend to the 
publication of images of public figures’ children.  
 
(ii) Public interest in a thriving newspaper industry 
 
Finally, the argument in Weller that there is public interest in a thriving newspaper industry 
is not theoretically sound. While Weller accepted that innocuous photographs solely 
published for entertainment purposes did not contribute to a “debate of general interest”, 
the Court asserted that the “public interest” in a flourishing newspaper industry supports 
the media’s freedom of expression claims.  
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The Queen’s Bench accepted that fewer newspapers will exist where they cannot publish 
purely entertaining material which interests the public. Dingemans J justified this argument 
in accordance with the constitutional democracy theory. According to the Court, the media 
must “flourish” in order to fulfil their role as a “pillar of democracy”.209  
 
This argument is subject to the aforementioned critique employed against the constitutional 
democracy theorists. The argument assumes that a “flourishing” media environment is the 
most effective vehicle for democratic debate, implying that excessive government 
regulation thwarts the media’s ability to fulfil their democratic purposes. However, the 
mere fact that a newspaper industry is “flourishing” commercially does not imply that the 
press are effectively supporting democratic debate. In contrast, the Leveson Enquiry 
highlights that a failure to regulate the media industry may be counterproductive for 
democracy. In the absence of regulation, commercial media entities are incentivised to 
subordinate democratic public service goals in favour of commercial profit.  A 
commercially-thriving newspaper environment will therefore be more inclined to publish 
entertaining content of mass appeal than stories relevant to democratic governance.  
 
While the Weller approach to defining public interest would unlikely be challenged in the 
European courts given the ECtHR’s recent affirmation of states’ margins of appreciation,210 
the approach does not rest on strong theoretical foundations. On the contrary, the 
encouragement of a flourishing media industry may be detrimental to the press’s 
functioning as a vehicle of democracy, thereby undermining the very rationale that Weller 
employs.  
 
(c) Conclusion: To what extent should the United Kingdom and ECtHR jurisprudence 
prompt a reconsideration of the Hosking approach to individuals with public 
profiles? 
 
This paper has first argued that Hosking’s extension of public interest to information 
satisfying the public’s “natural curiosity” is overly-broad, as it has little support from the 
theoretical justifications for freedom of expression. In contrast, the ECtHR’s normative 
approach to “general interest” is strongly supported by the argument from democracy. In 
accordance with Meiklejohn’s thesis, the approach views political information as most 
valuable in freedom of expression terms, as it contributes to citizens’ abilities to be 
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informed self-governors. This is particularly important in the context of the media, given 
its role as a facilitator of democratic debate.  
 
However, limiting “public” or “general” interest to political speech may be over-
prescriptive.  The constitutional democracy and marketplace of ideas theories highlight the 
dangers of affording excessive power to the state to determine the bounds of political 
speech. In the modern media context, it is difficult to draw a bold line between political 
and non-political content. Moreover, from a self-fulfilment and autonomy perspective, the 
public has an interest in receiving information beyond the political sphere, which may aid 
them in shaping beliefs or behaviour. This suggests that limiting “public interest” to the 
political sphere may be dangerous for freedom of expression. Indeed, in von Hannover (No 
2), the ECtHR appears to take a wider approach to the concept of public figure, suggesting 
that public interest is not limited to the political sphere.  
 
Nevertheless, while the above criticisms may suggest that New Zealand courts are justified 
in taking a wider approach to public interest than the conception advanced in von Hannover 
(No 1), courts should not completely disregard the normative approach to defining public 
interest. The innocuous photographs at issue in Hosking and Weller are not subject to the 
aforementioned criticisms of a narrow ECtHR approach. First, the constitutional 
democracy theory is not convincing in the context of the photographs. Given their 
innocuous nature, the photographs cannot be described as contributing to any form of 
political or social debate. Moreover, given the commercial nature of modern media, an 
absence of content regulation is counterproductive for democracy, as it detracts from the 
coverage of less lucrative but more democratically informative coverage. Therefore, there 
is little danger in the courts stifling public debate in regulating these images. Finally, the 
photographs can claim little support from the autonomy argument, as they are unlikely to 
aid the reader in making life choices or forming beliefs.  
 
This suggests that New Zealand courts should exclude innocuous photographs merely 
published to satisfy public curiosity from the ambit of legitimate public interest. While 
there is merit in the ECtHR normative approach, courts must apply it with caution in order 
to avoid excessively undermining the freedom of expression.  
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C  Medium of publication 
 
This section examines the extent to which the medium of publication should enhance an 
individual’s privacy claims. The paper criticises the failure to distinguish between mediums 
of publication in Hosking and argues that the ECtHR approach, which attributes special 
privacy weight to an image, is attractive. However, the limited framing of the Hosking tort 
appears to preclude New Zealand courts from following the European approach.    
1 Case analysis  
 
The New Zealand and English courts have diverged significantly in assessing the impact 
of different mediums of publication on an individual’s privacy claim.  
 
(a) Hosking  
 
Hosking asserted that the medium of publication does not have an impact on a plaintiff’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. According to the Court of Appeal, an image is “not 
essentially different from a full written description.”211 Given that the Hosking twins’ 
names, ages and the fact that their parents were separated were already in the public 
domain, a photograph of the children was not considered a significant addition to this 
publically-available information.212  
 
(b) United Kingdom 
 
While the United Kingdom courts have clearly accepted a distinction between written 
descriptions and photographs, the extent to which the medium of publication impacts on 
claimants’ reasonable expectations of privacy and the ultimate balancing test remains 
unclear.   
 
(i) Campbell  
 
In Campbell, the Court held that images convey a greater quantity of information vis à vis 
non-visual representations of analogous events. This increases the claimant’s expectation 
of privacy and the weight attached to the claimant’s art 8 interests under the ultimate 
balancing test. While the Court could not see an intrinsic difference between photographs 
  
211 Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [86].  
212 At [164]. 
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and written mediums,213 the majority held that an image conveys “a thousand words”.214 
As a result, publication cannot be justified solely on the basis that a written description of 
its content would be permissible.215 In the context of Campbell, the majority considered 
that the inclusion of images in addition to a written article tipped the balance in favour of 
the claimant’s privacy protection.216 
 
(ii) Reklos  
 
In contrast, Weller attached particular importance to images in the context of art 8 of the 
ECHR, in accordance of the ECtHR case of Reklos. In Reklos, the ECtHR defined art 8 
broadly, and held that it encompassed an individual's right to personal development.217 A 
person’s image was deemed to be protected by art 8 for its role in facilitating personal 
development.218 In particular, an image reveals the subject’s “unique characteristics” and 
enables the person to be distinguished them from his or her peers.219 Given the importance 
of one’s image in the context of art 8, Reklos held that art 8 can be breached by the mere 
taking of a photograph without the subject’s consent, regardless of whether publication 
occurs.220 
 
Citing Reklos, Weller held that photographs were essentially different from other mediums 
of publication. While the Court did not purport to endorse a right to one’s image in the 
same way as Reklos, Dingemans J considered that a person’s image was particularly worthy 
of privacy protection as it “constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her 
personality.”221 The Court insisted that the photographs at issue did not merely show “white 
babies” but conveyed the twins’ distinct personalities through their “difference in reaction 
and interest” during the shopping trip.222 This was cited as a central factor supporting a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.223 Given the refusal to attach particular significance to 
photographs in Campbell, Weller appears to depart from the House of Lords in this context.  
  
213 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 53, at [213].  
214 At [31] and [72]. 
215 At [31] and [72].  
216 At [121].  
217 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece, above n 114, at [39]. 
218 At [40]. 
219 At [40]. 
220 At [42]. 
221 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, above n 2, at [153].  
222 At [154]. 
223 At [171]. 
48 
 
2  To what extent should the United Kingdom jurisprudence prompt a 
reconsideration of the Hosking approach to mediums of publication?  
 
The Court of Appeal’s failure to distinguish between mediums of publication in assessing 
the Hoskings’ reasonable expectations of privacy can be criticised in the light of the 
aforementioned United Kingdom and ECtHR jurisprudence.  
 
(a) Evaluation of the Hosking approach 
 
Hosking’s claim that a photographic depiction of an event can be equated to a written 
publication is clearly over-simplistic, and would be challenged by the courts in Campbell 
and Reklos. As Campbell notes, a picture is worth “a thousand words”. Moreover, Reklos 
suggests that the personality manifest in a visual representation of a person makes an image 
particularly worthy of privacy protection. The respective merits of the Campbell and Reklos 
approaches are discussed in the following paragraphs.   
 
(b) Evaluation of the United Kingdom approach 
 
(i) Campbell 
 
The Campbell claim that an image portrays a greater quantity of information than an 
equivalent written description appears self-evident, and is supported by commentators. It 
seems a truism that a photograph portrays more detailed information than can be achieved 
by a sketch or written description of the equivalent event or object. Moreover, Moreham 
agrees that an image conveys a more detailed and accurate depiction of a person than could 
be recorded through other mediums, as an image enables the viewer to observe events first-
hand instead of relying on the accuracy of a narrator.224 
 
However, the refusal in Campbell to recognise qualitative differences between 
photographic representations and other forms of publication can be challenged. Legal 
commentator Tatiana Synodinou contrasts the continental European states’ readiness to 
attribute particular value to images with the English aversion to this idea.225 According to 
Synodinou, the English courts’ limited appreciation for the value of images results from an 
  
224 Nicole Moreham, above n 11, at 614.  
225 Tatiana Synodinou “Image Right and Copyright Law in Europe: Divergences and Convergences” (23 
April 2014) MDPI Open Access Publishing < http://www.mdpi.com> at [2.2].  
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erroneous doctrinal basis for the misuse of private information action. 226 The misuse of 
private information action’s genesis in common law breach of confidence has led to 
“piecemeal protection” for images, as the action evolved out of concerns for the 
confidential nature of information as opposed to the need to protect an individual’s 
“personality” rights. Syndinou contends that this doctrinal genesis has prevented the 
English courts from fully appreciating the nexus between images, personality rights and art 
8 of the ECHR.227   
 
(ii) Reklos  
 
The Reklos approach to images, partly adopted in Weller, is supported by continental 
European provisions and privacy commentators. Reklos asserted that images are 
particularly worthy of protection in the privacy context as they portray “chief attributes” of 
the subject’s personality.228 This interpretation is accepted in several European states. For 
instance, art 9 of the French Civil Code attaches legal protection to one’s image, accepting 
that a photograph is an important expression of personality.229 Similarly, privacy 
commentators contend that images are objectively more “private” than their written 
counterparts. As Andrew McLurg argues, photographs enable the viewer to observe part 
of the person, causing the subject to lose control of “an aspect of herself.”230 Moreover, 
Synodinou views a person’s image as constitutive of an “element of personhood”.231  
 
Nevertheless, the Reklos approach to photographs may not be adopted by the New Zealand 
courts for several reasons. First, the applicability of Reklos to young children, as in the 
factual context of Hosking and Weller, can be challenged. In Reklos, the parents of a 
newborn baby objected to a photograph of their child taken without their consent. The 
ECtHR held that a photograph of any person is capable of art 8 protection, as it conveys 
essential attributes of the individual’s personality.232  
 
However, the extent to which a photograph of a newborn baby conveys unique personality 
can be questioned. As the respondents argued, a day old baby is not sufficiently developed 
  
226 Tatiana Synodinou, above n 225, at [2.2].  
227 At [2.2].  
228 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece, above n 114, at [40].  
229 Tatiana Synodinou, above n 225, at [2.1.1].  
230 Andrew McClurg ‘‘Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in 
Public Places’’ (1995) 73 NCLR 989 at 1041. 
231 Tatiana Synodinou, above n 225, at [1].  
232 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece, above n 114, at [39].  
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for its facial expressions to convey personality, as “the psychological and emotional 
environment has not yet been formed.”233 Therefore, a newborn baby’s photograph does 
not express any form of personality upon which art 8 protection can be based. Similarly, 
one could argue that the 10 month old twins in Weller and the 18 month old twins in 
Hosking were not sufficiently developed for a photograph to portray their unique 
personality attributes. This suggests that the Reklos characterisation of images in the 
context of art 8 is problematic in the context of young children.    
 
Second, the Reklos approach would be difficult to justify in the New Zealand context, given 
that it has not yet been embraced as English precedent. The House of Lords in Campbell 
did not characterise a photograph as intrinsically different from other mediums, but merely 
stated that a picture is more detailed than its written counterpart.234 In contrast, Weller 
appears to depart from Campbell in indicating that a photograph has particular significance 
in the privacy context.  
 
This departure is unwarranted for several reasons. First, Campbell and Murray maintained 
that the United Kingdom courts have not yet created a right to one’s image. The mere fact 
of photography is insufficient to qualify for a misuse of private information action without 
subsequent publication.235 While Dingemans J in Weller did not go as far as Reklos in 
declaring the existence of image rights per se, attaching considerable importance to a 
person’s photograph in the context of art 8 greatly increases their expectations of privacy 
and attached to their privacy rights under the ultimate balancing test. In the absence of 
compelling countervailing art 10 arguments, this could have the practical implication of 
creating an image right. As noted in the public places discussion in part A of this section, 
lower English courts should not substantially depart from superior courts’ decisions in 
favour of ECtHR jurisprudence. This suggests that the use of the Reklos approach in Weller 
incorrectly departs from House of Lords precedent. In the light of this uncertainty in the 
United Kingdom domestic law, Reklos does not provide persuasive precedent for the New 
Zealand courts.  
 
Third, adopting the Reklos approach to images under the Hosking tort may prove 
problematic. According to Reklos, art 8 of the ECHR has a broad meaning and is incapable 
of precise definition. The provision encompasses the “right to identity” and the “right to 
  
233 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece, above n 114, at [10].  
234 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 53, at [31], [72] and [156].     
235 Murray v Big Pictures Ltd, above n 69, at [54]; Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 53, at [154].  
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personal development.”236 This broad scope allows the English and European courts to 
consider the extent to which a photograph conveys one’s personality in determining 
whether a privacy breach has occurred. In so doing, the courts recognise the intrinsic value 
of one’s image, without requiring the presence of tangible harm. In contrast, as discussed 
in part A of this section, the Hosking tort is grounded in notions of “humiliation” and 
“embarrassment”.237 This appears to preclude considerations of the inherent value of one’s 
image, instead focusing on the tangible emotional harm resulting from publication. This 
suggests that the framing of the Hosking tort prevents an application of the Reklos 
description of images as “chief attributes” of the subject’s personality.  
 
Nevertheless, it is open to New Zealand courts to appreciate Campbell’s quantitative 
distinction between images and written descriptions. Given that the Campbell approach 
relates solely to the quantity of information conveyed, as opposed to assessing the 
significance of that information in the context of privacy, the underlying differences in the 
New Zealand and United Kingdom conceptions of privacy do not preclude a New Zealand 
application of Campbell. In the light of the over-simplistic nature of the Hosking approach, 
following Campbell would be an advisable alternative for New Zealand courts. 
Nevertheless, Reklos highlights the limitations of the narrow framing of the Hosking tort. 
This further underscores the need for a reconsideration of the rationale for legal privacy 
protection in New Zealand.  
 
(c) Conclusion: To what extent should the United Kingdom jurisprudence prompt a 
reconsideration of the Hosking approach to mediums of publication? 
 
The United Kingdom and ECtHR approaches to mediums of publication expose central 
flaws in the Hosking assumption that photographs can be equated with written descriptions 
in the privacy context. However, while the Reklos appreciation of the intrinsic value of 
images is supported by commentators, this approach is unlikely to be adopted by the New 
Zealand courts due to the uncertainties in English domestic law and the narrow construction 
of the Hosking tort.  
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V Conclusion: to what extent should recent English privacy jurisprudence 
trigger New Zealand courts to depart from Hosking? 
 
The recent privacy law evolution in the English courts reveals both inadequacies in the 
Hosking reasoning and the increasing constitutional divergences between New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom in the field of privacy.  
 
First, the English courts’ increasing willingness to protect the privacy of individuals 
engaged in innocuous activities in public places highlights the overly-confined nature of 
the Hosking tort. The requirement in Hosking that a publication be “highly offensive” 
precludes an extension of the tort to cover such activities. This elucidates theoretical 
inadequacies in Hosking, where the Court appeared to view privacy as based on objective 
notions of harm as instead of appreciating its role in facilitating individual autonomy and 
dignity. While the Weller approach accords with Moreham’s conception of privacy, the 
framing of the Hosking tort and the emphasis placed on freedom of expression in Hosking 
appear to preclude a similar extension in the New Zealand context. This suggests that the 
New Zealand courts should revisit the underlying rationale of privacy, and reconsider the 
narrow framing of the tort of privacy.  
 
Second, the European and English courts’ aversion towards readily reducing individuals’ 
privacy expectations as a result of their public profiles should prompt a reconsideration of 
Hosking. In Hosking, the Court considered that “legitimate public interest” in public 
figures’ lives extended to mere curiosity about personal and family matters, and thereby 
reduced their privacy rights vis à vis the media’s freedom of expression claims. While the 
English approach has not been conclusively resolved, Weller suggested that public figures 
should only receive diminished privacy rights insofar as their personal information makes 
a contribution to public debate.  
 
The Hosking extension of public interest to “tittle tattle” is not well-supported by freedom 
of expression theory, whereas the Weller approach accords more closely with these 
theoretical justifications. However, excessive judicial power to determine the normative 
content of “public interest” risks undermining the media’s freedom of expression. This 
paper therefore submits that material of mere public interest should not be protected by the 
courts, but New Zealand courts should nevertheless afford substantial deference to the 
media in defining material in the public interest.  
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Third, the English and European distinctions between mediums of publication highlight 
the superficial nature of the Hosking treatment of photographs. While Hosking claimed that 
the medium of publication does not impact on a plaintiff’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy, Campbell and Reklos suggested that images should attract higher privacy 
protection vis à vis written descriptions due to their quantitative and qualitative differences. 
While it remains unclear whether the English courts will treat images as “chief” 
manifestations of personality in accordance with the ECtHR, the Reklos approach will 
unlikely be embraced by the New Zealand courts due to the Hosking tort’s foundation on 
emotional harm. This further indicates the necessity for New Zealand courts to review the 
theoretical foundations and formulation of the tort of privacy.   
 
In summary, the contrasting outcomes of Hosking and Weller reflect significant post-
Hosking divergences in privacy law between New Zealand and the United Kingdom. While 
these developments can be somewhat attributed to the ever-expanding conception of 
privacy under the ECHR, they also highlight discrepancies between the Hosking tort and 
the theoretical underpinnings of privacy and freedom of expression. In the light of the 
English developments, Hosking will likely be significantly amended in future New Zealand 
decisions.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: The text of this paper is approximately 14, 954 words. 
54 
 
VI Bibliography 
 
A Cases 
1 Europe 
Case C-1234/05 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece [2009] ECHR 200.  
Case C-40660/08 Von Hannover v Germany [2012] ECHR 228.  
Case C-59320/00 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294.  
 
2 New Zealand 
C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1.  
P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC).   
Rogers v TVNZ [2007] NZSC 91, (2011) NZULR 386. 
Tucker v News Media Ownership [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (CA). 
 
3 United Kingdom 
A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2002] 3 WLR 542.   
Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23, [2001] 2 All ER 929.  
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] AC 457.   
Jameel v Wall [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] AC 359.  
McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2007] 3 WLR 194.  
Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2008] 3 WLR 1360.   
Naomi Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] 2 WLR 80.  
R v Central Independent Television [1994] Fam 192 (CA). 
55 
 
Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB).  
 
B Legislation 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).  
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
 
C Treaties 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 
1989, entered into force 2 September 1990). 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS 
5 (opened for signature 4 November 1990, entered into force 3 September 1953).   
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 179 (signed 16 December 
1966, entered into force 20 March 1976). 
 
D Government documents 
Law Commission A Conceptual Approach to Privacy (NZLC MP19, 2007).   
Ministry of Justice A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper 1985.  
 
E Books 
Alexander Meiklejohn Political Freedom: the Constitutional Powers of the People (Harper 
and Row, New York, 1965).  
Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, Wellington, 2006). 
Charles Raab “Privacy, Democracy, Information” in B Loader (ed) The Governance of 
Cyberspace (Routledge, London, 1997) 155. 
56 
 
David Feldman “Privacy-Related Rights and their Social Value” in Peter Birks (ed) Privacy 
and Loyalty (Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 1997) 15.  
David Hoffman The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge 
University Press, United Kingdom, 2011). 
Edward J Bloustein “Privacy as an aspect of human dignity: an answer to Dean Prosser” in 
Ferdinand D Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology 
(Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1984) 156.  
Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005).   
F Schauer Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, United 
Kingdom, 1982). 
H Fenwick and G Phillipson Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford 
University Press, United Kingdom, 2006). 
John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (5th ed, Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 2005). 
John Gray and GW Smith JS Mill on liberty: in focus (Routledge, London, 1991). 
Mark Warby, Nicole Moreham and Iain Christie Tugendhat and Christie’s Law of Privacy 
and the Media (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2011).  
Michael Stace “BSA’s regulatory framework: recent decisions on privacy and consent” in 
Broadcasting Standards Authority (ed) Real Media Real Privacy: Privacy and informed 
Consent in broadcasting (Dunmore Press Ltd, Wellington, 2004). 
Stanley I Benn “Privacy, freedom, and respect for persons” in Ferdinand D Schoeman (ed) 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, United 
Kingdom, 1984) 223. 
 
F Journals 
Charles Fried “Privacy” (1968) 77(3) YLJ 475. 
James Rachels ‘‘Why privacy is important’’ (1975) 4(4) Phil & Publ Aff 323. 
57 
 
Jonathan Morgan “Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” trouble” (2003) 62 
CLJ 444.   
Megan Richardson “Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Hosking v 
Runting” (2004) 11 NZBLQ 82. 
Melissa Waterfield “Now you see it, now you don’t: the case for a tort of infringement of 
privacy in New Zealand” (2004) 10 CLR 182. 
Nicole Moreham “Hosking v Runting and the protection of privacy in public places” [2006] 
NZLJ 265.   
Nicole Moreham “Privacy in Public Places” (2006) 65 CL J 606.  
Nicole Moreham “The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention of 
Human Rights: A Re-examination” [2008] EHRLR 44.  
Peter Highton “Protection of children’s privacy in the media” (2006) 5 NZFLJ 147.   
Ruth Gavison ‘‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’’ (1979) 89 Yale LJ 421.  
 
G Internet materials 
Alan Ringwood “Crucial to protect press freedom” (5 December 2012) New Zealand 
Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
Katherine Laura Thompson “Balancing Privacy and Free Speech: A Critique of English 
Privacy Law under the Human Rights Act” (2 December 2013) Durham University 
<www.etheses.dur.ac.uk>.  
“Leveson Enquiry: Actress Sienna Miller gives evidence” (24 November 2011) British 
Broadcasting Company <www.bbc.com>.   
Rebecca Quilliam “Lorde blasts “stalker” photographer” (4 May 2014) New Zealand 
Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
Sunday Star Times “Lorde pushes back against being papped” (11 May 2014) Stuff.co.nz 
<www.stuff.co.nz>.  
58 
 
Tatiana Synodinou “Image Right and Copyright Law in Europe: Divergences and 
Convergences” (23 April 2014) MDPI Open Access Publishing < http://www.mdpi.com>. 
“The Leveson Enquiry” (29 November 2012) The National Archives 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk>. 
“The Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion” (16 July 2004) Human Rights 
Commission <www.hrc.co.nz>. 
 
